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RESPECTING PRIVACY AND AFFIRMING EQUALITY:
THE DUAL SIGNIFICANCE OF LEUNG V SECRETARY
FOR JUSTICE FOR HONG KONG'S GAY COMMUNITY
U
Robyn Emerton*
On 24 August 2005, Justice Hartmann handed down a landmark judgment in
Leung v Secretary for Justice, the first "gay rights" case to come before the Hong
Kong courts. In a judicial review application, the High Court declared that four
provisions in the Crimes Ordinance relating to sexual activities between men were
unconstitutional and therefore invalid, on the basis that they arbitrarily interfered
with the private lives of gay men, and discriminated against them on the ground of
their sexual orientation. The Government has appealed the decision regarding section
11 8C (only), which prohibits "buggery" between men where one party is under the
age of 21. This article calls for the Court of Appeal to uphold Justice Hartmann's
ruling, arguing that it should comfortably withstand the Government's grounds
of appeal, and highlighting further potential precedents and arguments in support. It
also responds to an article in Volume 35, Part 3 of this journal, in which Robert
Danay argued that the offence of buggery should have been analysed on privacy
grounds alone, and that the use of the equality analysis had resulted in the judicial
promotion of a negative, "hypersexualised homosexual stereotype". This article con-
tends that upholding the dual aspects of the judgment is important for continuing
Hong Kong's progressive jurisprudence in the fields of equality and human rights,
and also has positive significance for Hong Kong's gay community, by both respect-
ing the privacy and affirming the equality of gay men in Hong Kong society.
Introduction
On 24 August 2005, Justice Hartmann handed down a landmark judgment in
Leung v Secretary for Justice,' the first "gay rights" case to come before the
Hong Kong courts. In this judicial review application, the High Court
declared that four provisions in the Crimes Ordinance 2 relating to sexual
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong (until February 2006). The author is
particularly grateful to Carole Petersen, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong,
Lison Harris, Assistant Research Officer, Centre for Comparative and Public Law ("CCPL"), Uni-
versity of Hong Kong, and the anonymous reviewer for their valuable comments on an earlier draft.
The author would also like to thank Usaia Ratuvili, student of the LLM Human Rights Programme,
University of Hong Kong (2005-2006) and Senior Legal Officer of the Fiji Human Rights Commis-
sion, for bringing the case of Nadan and McCoskar v State to her attention and Mary Katherine Burke,
summer intern at the CCPL, University of Hong Kong, for helping to document the court proceed-
ings in the Leung case.
1 Leung T. C. William Roy v Secretary for Justice, HCAL 160/2004 (referred to below as "Leung").
2 Cap 200.
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activities between men were unconstitutional and therefore invalid, on the
basis that they arbitrarily interfered with the private lives of gay men, and
discriminated against them on the ground of their sexual orientation.
Three of the impugned provisions apply only to sexual conduct between
men, namely "gross indecency" with a man under the age of 21 (section 1 18H),
and private group activities involving "buggery" and "gross indecency"
between men of any age (sections 118F(2)(a) and 118J(2)(a)). The fourth
provision, section 118C, prohibits "buggery", (as it is still archaically referred
to in the Crimes Ordinance)' between men where one party is under the age
of 21, under penalty of life imprisonment. Unlike the other three provisions,
section 11 8C has a heterosexual counterpart, as section 118D separately pro-
hibits "buggery" between men and women where the woman is under the age
of 21, and subjects it to the same penalty. However, section 11 8C criminalises
both parties to the sexual act, whilst section 1 18D criminalises only the older
party. The Legislative Council introduced these provisions in 1991 as part of
a legislative scheme to regulate sexual conduct between men. This scheme
replaced previous legislation that had criminalized all forms of male homo-
sexual conduct.'
Although Justice Hartmann's ruling was celebrated by the gay community
and human rights advocates in Hong Kong and abroad, it unleashed a certain
amount of criticism. This was directed primarily at the ruling on the offence
of buggery, which had the effect of lowering the age of consent for anal inter-
course between men to 16. Some also questioned the appropriateness of the
court determining what many perceived as a sensitive issue, which was better
left to the legislature.' Celebrations were silenced when the Government -
seemingly in response to public concern - appealed the decision regarding
section 118C (only) on 30 September 2005. The appeal is expected to be
heard in the summer of 2006.
This article calls for the Court of Appeal to uphold Justice Hartmann's
ruling. Whilst the judgment has been criticised by one author as "at times
rather conclusory, and at other times somewhat imprecise",' its reasoning goes
The author prefers the less derogatory term "anal intercourse", but uses the term "buggery" to be
consistent with the Crimes Ordinance and other relevant law. The term "gay men" is also used in
preference to "homosexuals".
4 For a discussion of the legal and political developments that led to decriminalisation, see Carole
Petersen, "Values in Transition: The Development of the Gay and Lesbian Rights Movement in
Hong Kong", (1997) 19 Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 337.
5 For example, "Government should appeal against gay ruling" (editorial), Ming Pao, 26 Aug 2005;
"Mr Justice Hartmann ignored the protection of adolescents", Wen Wei Po, 26 Aug 2005; "Hartmann
doesn't know the difference between men and women", Oriental Daily, 27 Aug 2005; "Court should
respect their judicial freedoms", Ta Kung Pao, 29 Aug 2005. See, however, eg, "The best gift
Mr Justice Hartmann could give to gays", Ming Pao, 28 Aug 2005; "A blow struck for the rights of
the individual" (editorial), South China Morning Post, 25 Aug 2005 and "Gay sex law a milestone for
Hong Kong" (editorial), South China Morning Post, 29 Aug 2005.
6 Robert Danay, "Leung v Secretary for Justice: Privacy, Equality and the Hypersexualised Homosexual
Stereotype", (2005) 35 HKLJ 545, 547.
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to the heart of the issues, and is based on strong legal precedent from interna-
tional and comparative sources. This article argues that the judgment should
comfortably withstand the Secretary for Justice's grounds of appeal, and high-
lights further potential precedents and arguments in support of the High Court's
findings, including a recent authority from the High Court of Fiji. The article
also responds to an article in Volume 35, Part 3 of this journal, in which
Robert Danay argued that the offence of buggery should have been analysed
on privacy grounds alone, and that the use of the equality analysis had resulted
in the judicial promotion of a negative, "hypersexualised homosexual stereo-
type". This article contends that if the Court of Appeal determines the case
on a privacy basis only - even if ultimately it affirms the unconstitutionality of
section 11 8C - this move would constitute a step backwards for Hong Kong's
otherwise progressive jurisprudence in the fields of equality and human rights.
Sexual Orientation as a Prohibited Ground of Discrimination
Undoubtedly, the most significant outcome of the case for Hong Kong's
gay community is that the Government accepted "without demur"' that gay
men constitute a class of persons for the purposes of the equality and non-
discrimination guarantees in the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (the "Basic Law")
and the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (the "BORO"). Justice
Hartmann adopted this view, drawing primarily on Toonen v Australia,' in
which the United Nations Human Rights Committee held that the prohibi-
tion on discrimination on the ground of "sex" in Articles 2(1) and 26 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the "ICCPR")
(the equivalents of Articles 1(1) and 22 of the BORO) encompassed "sexual
orientation"."o Leung was the first time that the Hong Kong judiciary had
7 Leung (n 1 above), para 43.
Cap 383. Basic Law, Art 25 provides: "All Hong Kong residents shall be equal before the law";
BORO, Art 1(1) provides: "The rights recognized in this Bill of Rights shall be enjoyed without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion . .. birth or other status"; and
BORO, Art 22 provides: "All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrim-
ination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination
and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against any discrimination on any ground
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion ... birth or other status".
9 Toonen v Australia, Communication No 488/1992, UN Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994).
10 Ibid., para 8.7. This was later reaffirmed by the Human Rights Committee in Young v Australia, Com-
munication No 941/2000, UN Doc CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000. Justice Hartmann also referred to a
series of judgments of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights which came to a sim-
ilar conclusion. These include Sutherland v United Kingdom, 25186/94, 24 EHRR CD 22, and SaIgueiro
da Silva Mouta v Portugal, 332901/96, [1999] ECHR 176, which held that sexual orientation discrim-
ination is prohibited under Art 14 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (the "European Convention"), as discrimination on the grounds of "sex"
or "other status". Domestic courts have reached the same conclusion in interpreting constitutional
guarantees of equality, see, eg, the Canadian Supreme Court case of Egan v Canada [19951 2 SCR 513.
Vol 36 Part 1
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recognised sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination under
the Basic Law and the BORO."
Since counsel for the Secretary for Justice agreed the point at the hearing,
this finding has not been appealed. Leung therefore has the potential to play
a pivotal role in the future development of gay rights jurisprudence in Hong
Kong. Now any discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation by the
Government or public authorities" in law, policy or practice is clearly open
to judicial review. The Government is to be credited for upholding its inter-
national obligation to outlaw discrimination on the ground of sexual
orientation in this regard, although it is yet to introduce legislation prohibit-
ing such discrimination by both government and private actors."
The Government's Concession
Having agreed that the Basic Law and the BORO prohibit discrimination on
the ground of sexual orientation, the Secretary for Justice conceded that, if
the applicant was found to have sufficient standing (which Justice Hartmann
held to be the case), ' three of the challenged provisions were indeed "unsus-
" In Ng Ka Ling v Director of Immigration [1999] 2 HKCFAR 4 (referred to below as "Ng Ka Ling"), the
Court of Final Appeal held that the "other status" language in the equality and non-discrimination
provisions in the Basic Law and the ICCPR protects children born out of wedlock, and that certain
provisions in the Immigration Ordinance which discriminated against such children were therefore
unconstitutional. Thus Hong Kong's highest court has also acknowledged that the Basic Law and the
ICCPR (and therefore the BORO) protect classes of persons who suffer discrimination in society, even
though they are not expressly mentioned in those provisions. Significantly, this part of the Court's
decision still stands, notwithstanding the reinterpretation of the right of abode cases by the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress. Indeed, the Hong Kong Government did not argue
that the Court of Final Appeal had erred on this particular point when it sought the reinterpretation
12 BORO, Art 7, provides that the BORO binds the Government and public authorities.
13 This omission is despite numerous calls by the United Nations for the Hong Kong Government to
introduce anti-discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation, see Human Rights Committee,
UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add 117 (Nov 1999), para 15; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, UN Doc E/C 12/1/Add 58 (May 2001), para 15(c), and E/C 12/1/Add 107 (May 2005), paras
73 and 78(a); and Committee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add 271 (Sept 2005),
para 31. The issue is now under review by the Home Affairs Bureau's Sexual Minorities Forum. For
discussion of a private member's bill which attempted to prohibit discrimination on the ground of
sexual orientation, but was defeated in 1991, see Petersen (n 4 above). See also Phil C. W. Chan,
"The lack of sexual orientation anti-discrimination legislation in Hong Kong: breach of interna-
tional and domestic legal obligations", 9(1) InternationalJournal of Human Rights 69.
14 Justice Hartmann found that the applicant had sufficient standing, despite the absence of a public
authority decision or act, such as a criminal charge or conviction, having affected him. Although a
detailed discussion of this point is beyond the scope of this article, this finding (which has not been
appealed) has great potential for future human rights litigation. In essence, Justice Hartmann held
that the court's jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief in this case was derived from Art 35(1) of the
Basic Law, which guarantees Hong Kong residents the right of access to the courts and to judicial
remedies. This provision, he held, must include a direct remedy for those who argue that their funda-
mental rights have been undermined by primary legislation (Leung, para 56), and a litigant, such as
the applicant, should not be required to break the law in order to secure the route to an effective
remedy (ibid., para 59).
HeinOnline -- 36 Hong Kong L.J. 146 2006
Respecting Privacy and Affirming Equality 147
tainable in law"." Justice Hartmann confirmed this position, holding that
the provisions arbitrarily interfered with the applicant's right to privacy,
and directly discriminated against the applicant on the ground of sexual
orientation.16
The first of these three provisions is section 118H, which criminalises acts
of "gross indecency" (defined by Justice Hartmann as "sexual intimacy that
falls short of sexual intercourse, namely penetration"),' 7 between men, where
one is under the age of 21. By contrast, heterosexual and lesbian couples may
lawfully consent to such acts once they both attain the age of 16.18 Following
Leung, the reference in section 118H to "under the age of 21" is now to
be read as "under the age of 16", equalising the age of consent for gross
indecency (or sexual intimacy) for people of all sexual orientations."
The second and third of the impugned provisions are contained in sections
118F and 118J, which respectively prohibit men - whatever their age - from
engaging in buggery and gross indecency, "otherwise than in private". The
challenged sub-sections, 118F(2)(a) and 118(J)(2)(a), operate as "deeming
provisions", providing that where more than two persons take part in the act,
or are present during the act, the act will not be treated as done in private.
Group sexual activities involving more than two men are therefore pro-
hibited, even though they are carried out in private and consensually. By
contrast, heterosexual and lesbian people may lawfully engage in private
group sexual activities once they reach the age of 16.20 These deeming provi-
sions (although not sections 118F and 118J themselves, since they were not
challenged by the applicant)2' were struck down."
In a separate case four months later, the Magistrates' Court held that sec-
tion 118F in its entirety was also unconstitutional, following the reasoning in
the Leung case. Criminal charges were therefore dismissed against two men
who had allegedly engaged in anal intercourse in a car, their cases having
been postponed pending the judgment in Leung.23
The significance of the Government's concessions in Leung should not be
overlooked, since they have resulted in the dismantling of most of the 1991
legislative scheme regulating sexual conduct between men. But unfortunately,
the Government was not prepared at the hearing, nor following the ruling, to
abandon the last bastion of that legislative scheme, namely section 11 8C.
15 Leung (n 1 above), para 99.
16 Ibid., para 99.
17 Ibid., para 16.
18 Pursuant to the Crimes Ordinance, s 146.
19 Leung (n 1 above), para 99(i).
20 Ibid.
21 Some gay rights advocates, in personal conversations with the author, have expressed regret that
these two provisions were not challenged, although initially they seemed to be included in the
applicant's case.
22 Leung (n 1 above), para 99(i) and (iii).
23 Decision (by Magistrate Glass), TWCC 3105/2004 (16 Dec 2005).
Vol 36 Part 1
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The Last Bastion: Section 118C
Unlike the other three challenged provisions in Leung, section 118C has a
heterosexual counterpart, as section 118D also prohibits buggery between a
man and a woman, where the woman is under the age of 21. Counsel for the
Secretary for Justice argued at the hearing that section 118C was therefore
not discriminatory. He pointed out that different ages had been set for many
different activities, and argued that it "was not the function of the court to
tidy up the statute book", but that of the legislature. 24 Further, if successful,
the challenge to section 118C would result in the "idiosyncratic situation
where it is a crime to commit buggery with a woman under 21, but not with a
man under 21", in other words, a successful challenge would create a "yawn-
ing disparity" with 118D, and "the effect of the application would lead to the
very kind of disparity that ironically the applicant is complaining about".25
Citing a wide range of international and comparative jurisprudence,
Justice Hartmann rejected these arguments, declaring section 118C constitu-
tionally invalid on the grounds of both privacy and equality. His judgment
can be added to the growing number of cases in the 2000s in which the Hong
Kong courts have shown great receptiveness to international and comparat-
ive jurisprudence in interpreting the human rights guarantees in the Basic
Law and the BORO, 26 and keeps Hong Kong in line with progressive under-
standings of these two rights.
The Heart of the Government's Appeal
The heart of the Government's appeal is found in the second ground of the
Notice of Appeal, and echoes the argument made by counsel for the Secre-
tary for Justice at the High Court hearing. As this ground of appeal will be
discussed in detail below, it is reproduced in full below:
24 Notes taken by the author during the High Court hearing on 21 and 22 July 2005 ("Author's notes").
25 ibid.
26 See for example, Chow Shun Yung v Wei Pih Stella and Another (2003) HKCFA 18; Shum Kwok Sher v
HKSAR 2 [20021 HKLRD 793; Keung Kwok Hung and Others v Hong Kong SAR [2005] 3 HKLRD 212
and Yeung May-wan and Others v Hong Kong SAR [2005] 2 HKLRD 212. See further Carole Petersen,
"Embracing 'Updated' Universal Standards? The Role of Human Rights Treaties and Interpretative
Materials in Hong Kong's Constitutional Jurisprudence", paper presented at the Interpretations and
Beyond conference held at the University of Hong Kong, 25 Nov 2005. This judicial climate can be
contrasted with that of the late 1990s, when certain commentators found cause to remark that Hong
Kong courts had a tendency to dismiss international and comparative case law as "unhelpful" and to
look with "indifference and occasionally irritation" on attempts to invoke such jurisprudence before
them: Andrew Byrnes, "And Some Have Bills of Rights Thrust Upon Them: The Experience of
Hong Kong's Bill of Rights", in Philip Alston, Promoting Human Rights through Bills of Rights: Com-
parative Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p 352, and Johannes M. M. Chan,
"Hong Kong's Bill of Rights: Its Reception and Contribution to International and Comparative
Jurisprudence" (1998) 47 ICLQ 306, 314-315 and 355.
148 Robyn Emerton (2006) HKLJ
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"The judge was in error in finding in [147] and [151] that section 118C of
the Crimes Ordinance (Cap 200) was discriminatory on the basis of sexual
orientation and unconstitutional. The judge should have found that sec-
tion 118C was not in and of itself discriminatory, whether directly or
indirectly. The judge should have found that section 1 18C together [with]
section 1 18D of the same Ordinance, which prohibited buggery on a woman
who is under the age of 21, ensured the legislative intention of protection
of adolescents, both male and female from engaging in the conduct of
buggery: penetration per anum and resulted in no inequality before the
law. The Judge's finding and declaration of unconstitutionality of section
118C had exposed section 118D to a different form of challenge by girls
under the age of 21, namely on the ground of discrimination on the basis
of sex. The Judge was in error in [123] in declining to defer to the scheme
enacted by the Legislative Council dealing with a matter of specific
concern."27
The Privacy Analysis: Interference with Privacy
The Notice of Appeal does not explicitly challenge Justice Hartmann's finding
that section 118C arbitrarily interferes with the private lives of gay men, and
is therefore unconstitutional under Article 14 of the BORO. Rather, the only
explicit challenge is to his finding that section 118C is discriminatory, and
therefore unconstitutional under Article 25 of Basic Law and Articles 1(1)
and 22 of the BORO. On the other hand, the Notice of Appeal" states broadly
"that the judge was in error for declaring section 118C to be unconstitu-
tional" and that "the judgment should be set aside", which suggests that
the Secretary for Justice contends that the finding of unconstitutionality is
incorrect, on whatever ground.
This point will need to be clarified. In any event, as a practical matter,
counsel for the appellant might be advised to advance a strong, stand-alone
privacy argument, separately from the equality argument, should the Court of
Appeal be minded to accept privacy as the sole ground for declaring section
11 8C unconstitutional. However, this paper does not seek to make a case on
privacy grounds alone, but rather to support Justice Hartmann's legally sound
and enlightened decision that section 118C breaches both privacy and equal-
ity rights.
In order to establish a violation of the right to privacy under Article 14
of the BORO, 9 the applicant must show that section 118C constituted an
27 Notice of Appeal, 30 Sept 2005 (copy on file with the author).
28 Ibid., para 3.
29 BORO, Art 14, states "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy"
Vol 36 Part 1
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interference with his private life. The burden then lies on the Government
to prove that the interference was not arbitrary, and therefore that it was
constitutionally valid.
As stated by Justice Hartmann," it is well established under European
Convention jurisprudence that "private life" includes sexual life and sexual
orientation, thus section 118C clearly interferes with the applicant's private
life. The cardinal issue therefore becomes whether section 118C constitutes a
justified interference in the private life of the applicant (and gay men as a
class), in other words, whether it is constitutionally valid.
The Equality Analysis: Unequal Treatment
Similarly, there are two stages in respect of the right to equality. First, the
applicant must show that there was unequal treatment. Second, the Govern-
ment must prove that the unequal treatment was not discriminatory, in order
to uphold its constitutional validity.
The Notice of Appeal maintains that Justice Hartmann erred in finding
that section 118C was discriminatory, whether directly or indirectly, on the
basis that, together with section 118D, section 118C "ensured the legislative
intention of protection of adolescents, both male and female, from engaging
in the conduct of buggery, penetration per anum" and therefore "resulted in
no inequality before the law". It seems therefore that the Secretary for Justice
does not contest Justice Hartmann's finding that unequal treatment of gay
men arises under these provisions, but rather challenges Justice Hartmann's
finding that the justification for such differential treatment is constitution-
ally invalid. For completeness (and in the event that this interpretation of
the grounds for appeal is not correct), the first stage, as well as the second
stage of the equality analysis is considered below.
Direct Differential Treatment
Although section 118C has a heterosexual counterpart in section 118D,
Justice Hartmann rejected counsel for the Secretary for Justice's argument in
the hearing that there was "perfect symmetry" between the two provisions.1
Under section 118C, both the older and the younger man are criminally
liable, whereas, under section 118D, only the older man is criminally liable,
and not the younger woman." This obviously constitutes differential
treatment.
30 Leung (n 1 above), para 120 (citing Dudgeon v United Kingdom, 7525/76 [1981] ECHR 5, para 5.2).
31 Author's notes (n 24 above).
3 Note that it is not an offence for man aged between 16 and 21 to engage in anal intercourse with a
woman over 21.
150 Robyn Emerton (2006) HKLJ
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Indirect Differential Treatment or "Adverse Impact"
As recognised by Justice Hartmann, the indirect discrimination resulting from
section 118C constitutes the more "general and profound" violation in this
case, rather than the direct discrimination."
The European Commission and European Court of Human Rights have
developed strong jurisprudence stating that laws which set a different age of
consent for anal intercourse or other sexual activity between men, compared
to the age of consent for the same activity between men and women, violate
both the right to privacy and, in conjunction with that right," the right to
equality." Hong Kong's criminal law, however, sets the same age of consent
for anal intercourse, whether between men, or between men and women. On
its face, it is therefore a neutral law, applying identically to all people, regard-
less of their sexual orientation.
Identical treatment does not always constitute equal treatment, however.
The Human Rights Committee, in its General Comment 18 on Non-
Discrimination, recognises that "the enjoyment of rights and freedoms on
an identical footing does not mean identical treatment in every instance", 6
and states expressly that the concept of indirect discrimination is encom-
passed within the equality and non-discrimination clauses of the ICCPR. 7
Similarly, in Hong Kong, Justice Bokhary stated in R v Man Wai Keung (No
2) (as cited by Justice Hartmann) that "clearly there is no requirement of
literal equality in the sense of unrelenting identical treatment always. For
such rigidity would subvert rather than promote true even-handedness"."
For a finding of indirect discrimination, it must first be established that
section 11 8C has an adverse impact on gay men, or in other words, that it is
unequal in its application, if not on its face.
There is little international jurisprudence on apparently neutral buggery
(or other sexual offences) laws. In Toonen v Australia, one of the provisions
challenged was neutral, prohibiting "unnatural sexual intercourse" between
any persons. Having already determined that the provision violated the
3 Leung (n 1 above), para 127.
3 The right to equality under Art 14 of the European Convention is not an independent right, but can
only be raised in conjunction with another right under the European Convention.
3 See, eg, Sutherland (n 10 above); L and V v Austria, 39392/98; 39829/98 (2003) ECHR 20; SL v
Austria, 45330/99 [2003] ECHR 22; and B B v United Kingdom 53760/00 [20041 ECHR 65.
36 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment 18, Non-Discrimination (1989), para 8.
3 Ibid., the Human Rights Committee (at para 7) draws on the definitions of discrimination contained
in the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Con-
vention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, to interpret the term "discrimination"
in the ICCPR to encompass distinctions which have "the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing
the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms"
(emphasis added).
38 (1992) 2 HKPLR 164, 179 (as cited in Leung (n 1 above), para 117). See also the seminal Supreme
Court of Canada case on concepts of equality, Andrews v the Law Society of British Columbia [1989 1
SCR 143.
Vol 36 Part 1
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ICCPR's privacy guarantee, however, the Human Rights Committee found it
unnecessary to consider whether there had also been a violation of the right
to equality.39 Although this minimalist approach is regrettably still common
in international jurisprudence, two Canadian cases and a recent Fijian case
provide direct authority on point. As these cases were decided in the context
of constitutionally entrenched bills of rights, they should be of particular
assistance to the Hong Kong courts.40 Justice Hartmann drew on one of
these cases, R v M(C) (indexed also as R v CM, as cited in his judgment) as
most relevant to the case in hand.4 '
In R v M(C), the Ontario High Court held that section 159 of the Cana-
dian Criminal Code, which neutrally prohibited anal intercourse with any
person under the age of 18 years, not only breached the right to privacy, but
also indirectly discriminated against gay men on the ground of their sexual
orientation, since the age of consent for vaginal intercourse was 14 years. As
cited by Justice Hartmann,42 Justice Abella stated that section 159:
"arbitrarily disadvantages gay men by denying them until 18 a choice avail-
able at the age of 14 to those who are not gay, namely, their choice of
sexual expression with a consenting partner . . . Anal intercourse is a
basic form of sexual expression for gay men. The prohibition of this form of
sexual conduct found in section 159 accordingly has an adverse impact on
them. Heterosexual adolescents 14 or over can participate in consensual
intercourse without criminal penalty; gay adolescents cannot."43
In coming to his finding of adverse impact, Justice Hartmann felt it import-
ant to recognise, as advocated by the applicant, that buggery is a form of
sexual intercourse, and that it is the only form of sexual intercourse available
to gay men. Section 118C, he held, therefore prohibited them from engaging
"in the only form of sexual intercourse available to them", whilst hetero-
sexual couples were free to engage in sexual intercourse per vagina from the
age of 16, which showed that the legislative restrictions were not neutral.45
3 Toonen v Australia (n 9 above), paras 7.6 and 11.
40 See R v Sin Yau-ming [1991] 1 HKPLR 88, per Silke VP, 105-107.
41 R v M(C), 23 OR (3d) 629 (also indexed as R v MC, as cited in Leung) (cited by Justice Hartmann in
Leung (n 1 above), para 133). Justice Hartmann also referred (at para 140) to obiter in Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion in Lawrence v Texas (2003) 15 BHRC 111, p 126 - in which the United States
Supreme Court had before it a law applicable to anal intercourse between men only, unlike the
neutral law it had previously adjudicated in Bowers v Hardwick 478 US 186 - that "a sodomy law
which applied equally to the private consensual conduct of homosexuals and heterosexuals . . . would
not long stand" under the US due process clause.
42 Leung (n 1 above), para 139.
4 R v M(C) (n 41 above), p 636.
4 Leung (n 1 above), paras 134 and 135.
Ibid., para 135.
152 Robyn Emerton (2006) HKLJ
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This reasoning unfortunately paved the way for a challenge to his whole
indirect discrimination analysis. Thus the Notice of Appeal states that "the
Judge erred in finding in [20] that buggery was recognised to be a form of
sexual intercourse both in common law and under the Crimes Ordinance",
and "this erroneous finding had implications for his consideration of the issue
of indirect discrimination".46 Although this promises some rather interesting
arguments on appeal, perhaps reference to "penetration" rather than "sexual
intercourse", or reference to the fact that the law clearly limits gay men's
"choice of sexual expression", as stated in R v M(C) above, would satisfy the
point, without undermining the clearly rational basis for Justice Hartmann's
finding of adverse impact.
Only two days after the judgment was handed down in the Leung case, the
High Court of Fiji delivered its judgment in Nadan and McCoskar v State,"
which also involved a facially-neutral law. In this case, the two male appel-
lants had been sentenced to two years' imprisonment for having or permitting
"carnal knowledge of any person against the order of nature", contrary to
section 175 of the Fijian Penal Code (as well as for committing acts of gross
indecency between males, which constituted direct unequal treatment under
the law). The Court, taking note of Fiji's ratification of the ICCPR, held that
the appellants were entitled to expect an interpretation of the rights to
privacy and equality in accordance with the ICCPR, 8 and drew on various
international and comparative authorities in their analysis. On the adverse
impact point, the Court held that "whilst technically the provisions of sec-
tion 175 are not anti-homosexual, nonetheless they proscribe criminal conduct
essential to the sexual expression of the homosexual relationship and are
perceived as such"." This judgment therefore provides further persuasive
authority for upholding the ruling in Leung.
The Constitutional Validity of the Government's Justifications for
Section 1 18C under the Privacy and the Equality Analyses
Assuming section 1 18C is found (i) to constitute direct differential treat-
ment and (ii) have an adverse impact on gay men,50 the Secretary for Justice
nevertheless argues on appeal that section 118C, taken together with section
118D, does not result in any inequality before the law, "since both provisions
46 Notice of Appeal (n 27 above), Ground 1.
47 Nadan and McCoskar v State, Criminal Appeal Cases Nos: HHA 85 & 86 of 2005 (referred to below
as "Nadan").
48 Ibid., p 13.
50 bid., p 2 1.
50 This assumption is criticised by Danay, however, see p 166 below.
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ensure the legislative intention to protect adolescents, both male and female,
from engaging in the conduct of anal intercourse" and further, that the judge
was in error in declining to defer to the legislative scheme on this matter. The
Secretary for Justice will presumably raise the same justification regarding the
interference with privacy, although the point is not addressed in the Notice
of Appeal.
Before assessing the Secretary for Justice's particular justifications for the
constitutional validity of section 118C, a broader issue was raised on appeal,
which must be examined. This issue regarded the extent to which the court
should have given "weight" or "deference" to the views of the legislature in
the assessing the constitutional validity of section 118C.
The Need to Give Deference to the Legislature
Counsel for the Secretary for Justice argued in the High Court that, in deter-
mining the age of consent for homosexual and heterosexual buggery, it was
for the legislature, and not the judiciary to set the mark," and, "if it wished,
to reflect the conservative attitude of the Hong Kong community in matters
of sexual mores"." The Notice of Appeal states that "the Judge was in error
[in 123] in declining to defer to the scheme enacted by the Legislative
Council" on this matter. 3
Justice Hartmann accepted as a general principle that it was legitimate
for the legislature to legislate to protect those who, by reason of their youth,
are seen to be vulnerable, citing Modinos v Cyprus in which the European
Commission of Human Rights held:"
"Some degree of regulation of male homosexual conduct, as indeed of other
forms of sexual conduct, by means of the criminal law can be justified as
(necessary in a democratic society' . . . Furthermore, this necessity of some
degree of control may even extend to consensual acts committed in pri-
vate, notably where it is necessary to provide sufficient safeguards against
exploitation and corruption of others, particularly those who are specially
vulnerable because they are young . . ."
In R v M(C), Justice Abella similarly accepted that "line-drawing exercises"
are one of the proper functions of the government. She continued, however,
to state that "the lines must be reasonable and demonstrably justified when
Charter rights are involved"." This approach is echoed in Lau Cheong and
51 Leung (n 1 above), para 104.
52 Ibid., para 105.
53 Notice of Appeal (n 27 above), Ground 3.
5 16 EHRR 485,491 (following Dudgeon (n 30 above), para 49) (as cited in Leung (n 1 above), para 103).
55 R v M(C) (n 41 above), p 638.
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Another v HKSAR, 6 which Justice Hartmann referred to in some detail in
his judgment." In this case (which concerned the compatibility of the
mandatory life sentence for murder with the right to liberty and security of
the person), the Court of Final Appeal affirmed the constitutional entitle-
ment of the legislature to prescribe by legislation what conduct should
constitute criminal offences, and what punishment should ensue, and then
continued:
"But in the exercise of their independent judicial power, the courts have
the duty to decide whether legislation enacted is consistent with the Basic
Law and the Bill of Rights. If found to be inconsistent, the duty of the
courts is to hold that legislation invalid.""
As explained by Justice Hartmann," the Court of Final Appeal recognised in
Lau Cheong that, in discharging this constitutional obligation, "the context
in which such issues arise may make it appropriate for the courts to give par-
ticular weight to the views and policies adopted by the legislature"."o The
Court then cited a passage from Lord Hope in R v DPP, ex parte Kebilene,61
that "in some circumstances" it would be appropriate for the courts to recognise
that it should "defer, on democratic grounds, to the considered opinion of the
elected body .. . whose act or decision is said to be incompatible with the
[European] Convention.""
In order to determine which contexts or circumstances would require the
courts to give "particular weight" or "deference" to the views of the legisla-
ture, Justice Hartmann relied on a subsequent passage from Lord Hope, which
was not cited by the Court of Final Appeal in Lau Cheong.63 In that passage,
Lord Hope stated that this was a "discretionary area of judgment", which was
"much easier to be recognised where the issues involve questions of social
and economic policy, much less so where the rights are of high constitutional
importance or are of a kind where the courts are especially well placed to assess the
need for protection"."4 Justice Hartmann held, correctly in the author's view,
that it was "manifest" that the rights to privacy and equality were "funda-
mental human rights","5 and therefore matters of "high constitutional
56 [2002] 2 HKLRD 612 (referred to below as "Lau Cheong").
5 Leung (n 1 above), para 109 ff.
58 Lau Cheong (n 56 above), p 641. See also Ng Ka Ling (n 11 above), p 25G-.
5 Leung (n 1 above), para 110.
60 Lau Cheong (n 56 above), para 102.
61 [2000] 2 AC 326 (referred to below as "Ex parte Kebilene").
62 Ibid., p 381.
63 Leung (n 1 above), para 110.
64 Ex parte Kebilene, n 61 above, p 381.
65 Leung (n I above), para 114.
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importance", requiring the court's special protection from majority rule. Thus,
whilst he agreed that "deference must be given to the legislature", where funda-
mental human rights were at issue, such deference should be "limited", and
"cogent and persuasive reasons" would be required to justify any incon-
sistency with such rights.66
The Notice of Appeal states that Justice Hartmann was in error "in hold-
ing in [123] that the Court's deference to the intention of the Legislature
would be limited when fundamental human rights are in issue"." It further
states that this finding was contrary to the binding judgments in Lau Cheong
and HKSAR v Ng Kung Siu and Another," which both "endorsed the approach
of giving due weight to the judgment of the [legislature in the case of funda-
mental]" human rights".70
In the author's view, there may need to be clarification of what is meant by
giving "due weight" and "deferring" to the views of the legislature. Neither
term can mean complete subjugation to the legislature in the area of funda-
mental human rights, since this would subvert the separation of powers
envisaged by the Basic Law, and would deny the courts' constitutional duty to
review the validity of legislation passed by the legislature vis-&-vis the Basic
Law and the BORO.
Thus, in Ng Kung Siu (commonly known as the flag desecration case), to
which the Notice of Appeal refers, the Court of Final Appeal did indeed note
that "due weight" had to be given to the views of the legislature. Justice Bokhary
emphasised, however, that this did not amount to "deference", in the sense of
negating the court's duty to review whether the flag laws constituted a valid
restriction on the fundamental human right of freedom of expression:
"When a matter of the present kind comes before the courts, the question
is not which approach the judges personally prefer. It is whether the
approach chosen by the legislature is one permitted by the constitution. This
does not involve deference to the legislature. It is simply a matter of maintain-
ing the separation of powers . . . The legislature having chosen the approach
which protects the national and regional flags and emblems from desecra-
tion - having so chosen by enacting laws which provide such protection -
the question in the present case is whether those laws are constitutional.
And the answer, as I see it, depends on whether such laws are reconcilable
with the freedom of expression guaranteed by the constitution. The test is
one of reconcilability." (Emphasis added)
66 Ibid., para 123.
67 Notice of Appeal (n 27 above), Ground 2.
68 (1999) 2 HKCFAR 442.
69 This (presumed) part of the sentence is missing on the author's copy of the Notice of Appeal.
70 Notice of Appeal (n 27 above), Ground 3.
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Further, the circumstances in Leung can clearly be distinguished from Lau
Cheong and Ng Kung Siu. In Lau Cheong, the Court of Appeal stated that "the
context and circumstances of the present case . . . justify the courts giving
proper weight to the decision of the legislature"." It attached particular
significance to the fact that the provision in question had been passed "after
extensive debate" in 1993,72 that the legislature "arrived at that decision when
the Bill of Rights had been part of our law for nearly two years", and that the
relevant part of the provision had been impliedly confirmed again when the
provision was amended in 1997." In Ng Kung Siu, the legislation in question
had been enacted in 1997, subsequent to both the BORO and the Basic Law,
and indeed, only two years before the Court of Final Appeal considered its
constitutional validity in 1999.
By contrast, as Justice Hartmann emphasises in Leung,7 1 section 118C of
the Crimes Ordinance was put in place in 1991, several years before the Basic
Law came into force. Petersen points out that, at the time these provisions
were implemented, the Government was making an explicit attempt to com-
ply with the ICCPR,76 so this point is perhaps not so significant. Of more
import, however, is that the challenge to section 118C's constitutionality in
Leung came some 14 years after its enactment. During that time, the law has
not been subject to any further review by the legislature, except by a small
subcommittee.7 Meanwhile, however, medical opinion in the field has
changed dramatically, as described in Leung.71 It is now widely recognised
that sexual orientation is usually fixed, in both boys and girls, before the age
of puberty.79 As Justice Hartmann notes, this undermines the assumptions on
which the 1991 amendments were made, namely that homosexuality was "a
lifestyle choice, a chosen deviance, which could be avoided if the necessary
legal deterrents were in place"." International and comparative jurisprudence
in this field has also developed significantly in this time, partly in response to
the change in medical opinion, as discussed below. Finally, as Justice Hartmann
recognises, Hong Kong's social values may also have shifted." The significant
medical, legal and potentially also social developments since section 118C
71 Lau Cheong (n 56 above), para 105.
72 Ibid., para 107.
73 Ibid., para 106.
74 Ibid.
7 Leung (n 1 above), para 107.
76 Petersen (n 26 above), p 7.
n For a description of the work of the Legislative Council Panel on Home Affairs, Subcommittee to
Study Discrimination on the Ground of Sexual Orientation, see Chan (n 13 above).
78 Leung (n 1 above), paras 97 and 98.
7 See, eg, Sutherland (n 10 above), para 24, referring to a 1994 report of the British Medical Association
to this effect.
80 Leung (n I above), para 96.
81 Ibid., para 107.
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was passed by the legislature in 1991 suggest that Justice Hartmann was cor-
rect in giving less weight in Leung to the legislature's views in the particular
circumstances of this case, than the courts did in Lau Cheong and Ng Kung Siu.
Moreover, the Court of Appeal's finding as regards Justice Hartmann's state-
ment of principle that the courts should give only limited deference to the
views of the legislature when fundamental human rights are in issue, should
not affect the Court from coming to the same conclusion as the author
regarding the level of "deference" required of the court in the particular circum-
stances of the Leung case.
Finally, although the judgment in Leung now renders section 118D
vulnerable to constitutional challenge, this possibility clearly cannot require
the court to derogate from its duty to consider the constitutional validity
of the particular provision before them, namely section 118C, as suggested
by the Notice of Appeal.82
The Relevant Tests for Constitutional Validity
The next question is whether the Government's grounds for limiting the right
to privacy and the right to equality through section 11 8C are constitutionally
valid. First, a description of the relevant tests is apposite.
Right to equality
As mentioned above, equality does not always require identical treatment,
although identical treatment is the starting point. A difference in treatment
can be justified, and therefore found to be non-discriminatory, if certain con-
ditions are met. These conditions are not set out in the equality provisions
contained in the Basic Law or the BORO, but have been developed in inter-
national and comparative jurisprudence. In the Hong Kong context, Justice
Hartmann, citing R v Man Wai Keung (No 2), states that the courts require
demonstration of a "genuine need for some difference of treatment", and
evidence that the response is "rational" and "proportionate" to the need."
This, he notes, is comparable to the test developed by the European Commis-
sion and Court of Human Rights in respect of the European Convention's
equality guarantee." A similar formulation is also adopted by the Human
Rights Committee in General Comment 18 on Non-Discrimination.85
82 See Notice of Appeal (n 27 above), Ground 2.
83 R v Man Wai Keung (n 38 above), p 179, per Bokhary J (as cited in Leung (n I above), para 117).
84 Leung (n 1 above), citing (at para 120) Schmidt v Germany [1994] ECHR 13580/99, para 24, that the
difference in treatment must have an "objective and reasonable justification", namely that it must
pursue a "legitimate aim", and that there must be a "reasonable relationship of proportionality
between the means employed and the aim sought to be realized"
85 See United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment 18: Non-Discrimination (1989)
(n 36 above), which states (at para 13) "that not every differentiation of treatment will consti-
tute discrimination, if the criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim
is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the Covenant"
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Danay notes that Justice Hartmann did not explain how the three-part
test in R v Man Wai Keung (No 2), "which clearly relates to violations of
equality rights" also "worked to somehow justify violations of privacy rights".'
It is true that Justice Hartmann merges the analysis on constitutional validity
without proper explanation of the connection between the equality and
privacy-based tests, but his combined analysis can be explained by reference
to the General Comments and jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee.
The right to privacy
The privacy provision in Article 17 of the ICCPR, repeated verbatim in
Article 14 of the BORO, states that no one shall be subject to "arbitrary or
unlawful interferences with their privacy". It does not have a limitation clause,
as does the comparable right (Article 8) in the European Convention. In its
General Comment 16 on Article 17, however, the Human Rights Commit-
tee has stated that "the introduction of the concept of arbitrariness is intended
to guarantee that even interferences provided for by law should be in accor-
dance with the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant and should
be, in any event, reasonable in the particular circumstances" (emphasis added).8
Referring to this General Comment, the Human Rights Committee in Toonen
v Australia stated that it "interprets the requirement of reasonableness to im-
ply that any interference with privacy must be proportional to the end sought
and be necessary in the circumstances of any given case" (emphasis added)."
The above explanation completes the missing link in Justice Hartmann's
reasoning, namely that the concepts of necessity, reasonableness and propor-
tionality are equally applicable to the constitutional validity of a law interfering
with private life, as to the constitutional validity of a law resulting, directly or
indirectly, in unequal treatment.
The Government's Justification
As mentioned above, the Notice of Appeal states that any limitation of the
equality right (and presumably any interference with private life) which arises
through section 118C is justified as being designed to protect adolescents
from engaging in the conduct of buggery.
First, however, it is noted that, at least regarding the direct differential
treatment arising between 118C and 118D, the justification cited in the
Notice of Appeal is somewhat different from the justification given by the
legislature when it passed the law in 1991. As Justice Hartmann explained,
86 Danay (n 6 above), p 554.
87 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment 16 (1988): The right to respect of
privacy, family, home and correspondence, and protection of honour and reputation (Art 17), para 4.
88 Ibid., para 8.3.
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the legislature's most substantive reason at the time was that there was poten-
tial for blackmail by the younger man in the case of buggery between men
unless both parties were made criminally liable."9 That is, the legislature was
seeking to protect the older party from blackmail. Justice Hartmann rejected
the constitutional validity of this justification, relying on an Equal Opportu-
nities Commission ("EOC") report on the point." The EOC stated that there
was no empirical data to support the premise that men under 21 who commit
buggery were more likely to blackmail their partners than women under 21
who commit buggery, and if the legislative objective was to protect the older
male partner, the response was neither rational nor proportionate, as his in-
terests were already safeguarded by criminal provisions dealing with blackmail.
The second reason originally given by the legislature for the differential
treatment was that section 11 8D was "consistent with the existing provisions
designed to protect women and girls, where the female party to the sexual act
is not made criminally liable"." As Justice Hartmann states, this approach, at
least in the context of section 118D, was based on a stereotype that the woman
is the submissive partner, and the man the sexually active partner, "the
proposer, the one upon whom responsibility lies for any perceived deviance"."
This reason is also somewhat different than the Secretary for Justice's argu-
ment in the Notice of Appeal that the law was designed to protect adolescents,
including male adolescents, from engaging in the conduct of buggery.
In any event, in respect of both the interference with privacy, and the
direct and indirect inequality of treatment, the Government will need
to prove on appeal that criminalizing young men - with life imprisonment
no less - for anal intercourse is a necessary, rational and proportionate re-
sponse to the need to protect them from the risks of such intercourse (assuming
the alleged risks can be demonstrated). The constitutional validity of
this justification is considered below, in the context of the need to protect
the health of young people, and the need to protect the morals of young
people.
89 Leung (n 1 above), para 131. See further Hong Kong Security Bureau, Written Response to the Legisl-
ative Council Panel on Home Affairs, Subcommittee to Study Discrimination on the Ground of Sexual
Orientation, LC Paper No CB(2)2000/00-01(01) (2001), para 5: "the rationale of making a man
under 21 who commits consensual buggery with another man criminally liable was to guard against
the possibility of blackmail against the other partner."
90 Leung (n 1 above), para 132. See Hong Kong Equal Opportunities Commission, Comments by the
Equal Opportunities Commission to the Response of the Administration to the Legislative Council Panel on
Home Affairs, Subcommittee to Study Discrimination on the Ground of Sexual Orientation, LC Paper
No CB(2)2185/00-01 (2001).
91 Leung (n 1 above), para 129. See also, Principal Assistant Secretary for Security, Briefing to the Legis-
lative Council Panel on Home Affairs, Subcommittee to Study Discrimination on the Ground of Sexual
Orientation, LC Paper No CB(2)2188/00-01 (2001), para 6.
92 Leung (n 1 above), paras 129 and 130.
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Protection of Health of Young People
The protection of health argument holds little credence in international or
comparative jurisprudence as a valid basis for interference in the private lives
of young gay men, or as a basis for differential treatment towards them. In-
deed, the Hong Kong Government would be hard pressed to find evidence to
support this argument, where so many governments have failed before it. The
Secretary for Justice implicitly recognises this difficulty, in stating that "if
necessary" the legislature should be able to introduce such legislation on "moral
grounds alone".
In Sutherland v United Kingdom, as referenced in Leung,94 the European
Commission held that the UK's different age of consent for anal intercourse
between men (21 years) and men and women (16 years), constituted a dis-
criminatory interference in the private lives of gay men. Citing the Medical
Association's view that the recommended age of consent for homosexual and
heterosexual sexual activity (in this case, anal intercourse) should be 16 years,
and that the current law might inhibit efforts to improve the sexual health of
young gay men, the European Commission found that the UK Government
had produced no convincing reason against reducing the age of consent for
male homosexuals to 16 years, and moreover, stated that "to do so may yield
some positive health benefits". 95
Many young people in Hong Kong are sexually active. The British Medical
Association found in 1994 that the average age of first homosexual encounter
was 15.7 years, and said that it was "vital that these young homosexual men
receive effective health education and health care".9 6 Whilst the author is
not aware of any similar statistics in respect of the average age of commence-
ment of sexual activity amongst Hong Kong's young population, a supportive
and enabling environment is clearly crucial for young men to be open about
their sexuality, and to access sexual health services, including testing, coun-
selling and treatment." In particular, if young people feel comfortable about
seeking advice about anal intercourse, they are likely to be advised of the
importance of using a condom to prevent transmission of AIDS and other
sexually transmitted diseases. It is possible that they might otherwise incor-
rectly assume that they do not need to use a condom for anal intercourse,
since it does not carry the risk of pregnancy. It is also important that health
agencies, counsellors, teachers, support groups and the like do not feel
inhibited in giving sexual health advice to young people because of the law.
93 Ibid., para 102.
4 Ibid., para 97 (citing Sutherland (n 10 above), para 24).
95 Ibid.
96 Cited in Sutherland (n 10 above), para 24.
97 See, eg, Stonewall, Sexual Offences (Amendment) Bill: Parliamentary Briefing, p 15.
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In R v M(C), Justice Abella said, in a nutshell, that "health risks ought to
be dealt with by the health care system"." She attached particular significance
to the fact that section 159 of the Canadian Criminal Code (like section
118C of the Hong Kong Crimes Ordinance) made the younger party as well
as the older party criminally liable for engaging in anal intercourse. As dis-
cussed above, young people might therefore be inhibited from seeking advice
and health care regarding anal intercourse, and counsellors might be con-
cerned about potentially aiding and abetting a criminal offence. Thus, she
stated, a "provision ostensibly crafted to prevent adolescents from harm, may
itself, by inhibiting education about health risks associated with the behaviour,
contribute to the harm it seeks to reduce"." The same argument - highlighted
by Justice Hartmann's above reference to Sutherland, but not developed in his
analysis - could be argued equally well by the respondent in Leung on appeal.
In so far as the risk of AIDS or similar diseases might rationally require
some different response between anal intercourse and vaginal intercourse,
Justice Hartmann relied on the following passage of Justice Abella, to con-
clude that the provision was neither rational nor proportionate:"0
"The health risks from unprotected anal intercourse are real and ought to
be aggressively addressed. But in my view, the measures chosen in section
159 to protect young people from risk are arbitrary and unfair, compared
to the measures used to protect against the health risks for individuals
who prefer other forms of sexual conduct. There is no evidence that threat-
ening to send an adolescent to jail will protect him (or her) from the risks
of anal intercourse. I can see no rational connection between protecting
someone from the potential harm of exercising sexual preferences and
imprisoning that individual for exercising them. There is no proportional-
ity between the articulated health objective and the Draconian criminal
means chosen to achieve them."
Further support for this position is found in R v Roy,' 0' in which the Quebec
Court of Appeal, following R v M(C), declared that section 159 of the Cana-
dian Criminal Code was unconstitutional both on privacy and equality
grounds. In that case, the Court was not convinced in the first place that anal
intercourse, as compared with other (oral and vaginal) forms of sexual rela-
tions engaged in by young people, presented a particular health risk
necessitating special treatment under the criminal law. As regards the spread
98 R t M(C) (n 41 above), p 638.
99 ibid., p 638.
100 Leung (n I above), para 150 (citing R v M(C) (n 41 above), p 638).
101 125 CCC (3d) 442,
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of sexually transmitted diseases and AIDS, "the risk [was] not with the type of
sexual relation but rather with the degree of protection taken".102 Thus, it
held, the Government's response to the risk was neither rational nor propor-
tionate, and was therefore constitutionally invalid.
On the basis of these authorities, the Hong Kong Government will surely
struggle to prove that threatening young people who engage in anal inter-
course with the criminal sanction of life imprisonment is necessary, rational
and proportionate to protect them from the alleged health risks associated
with anal intercourse.
Protection of Morals of Young People
The next question is whether section 11 8C is necessary to protect the morals
of young people.
In the hearing, counsel for the Secretary for Justice (in light of the
applicant's reliance on many European Court and Commission precedents)
cautioned the Court against taking European cultures and values and "plug-
ging" them into Hong Kong. Justice Hartmann replied that he was mindful of
this, as well as of placing his own personal values on Hong Kong's multicultural
society.103 Further, in his judgment, he noted that he had not been given any
evidence of the prevailing attitude of the Hong Kong community towards the
matter.1o He stated, however, that it was of greater significance to recognise
that the law being challenged was passed in 1991, and the "Hong Kong courts
today have a constitutional obligation to consider whether legislation accords
with the Basic Law".o'0 In carrying out that constitutional duty, he considered
it "legitimate to look to the nature and purpose of the Basic Law itself, rather
than make a hazardous attempt to identify shifting social values".' The Basic
Law, he found, contemplated:
"an open and essentially democratic society, one based on the equality
of all persons before the law and on the dignity of the individual, by which
I mean all persons - in their sameness and difference - being worthy of
respect."'o
This citation indicates the central underpinnings of Justice Hartmann's judg-
ment, which are particularly relevant to the symbolic value of the ruling, as
discussed below.'
102 Ibid., p 469.
103 Author's notes (n 24 above).
10 Leung (n 1 above), para 106.
105 Ibid., para 107.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid., para 108.
108 See p 169 below.
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Justice Hartmann's finding is consistent with the European Court's state-
ment in Dudgeon v United Kingdom, that "the Court itself did not need to
make any value judgment as to morality" but had only to look "at whether
reasons to justify the interference were relevant and sufficient".o' Thus,
although Justice Hartmann accepted in principle that the legislature was
entitled to give expression to society's norms and values by prohibiting
homosexual activity involving adolescents,"o he emphasised that the Gov-
ernment still has to prove that the law is constitutionally valid, or in other
words, that the law passes through the Basic Law and BORO "hoops".
In this context, as noted by Justice Hartmann,"' the European Commis-
sion rejected in Sutherland the UK Government's argument that society was
entitled to indicate its disapproval of homosexual conduct and its preference
for a heterosexual lifestyle through the criminal law. Prevailing social values,
it found, were not sufficient justification for interference with the right to
respect for private life, nor did they constitute an objective or reasonable
justification for maintaining the differential age of consent for homosexual
and heterosexual acts. The UK law resulted in discriminatory treatment in
the exercise of the right to respect for private life under the European Con-
vention."' In Dudgeon, the question which the European Commission asked
was whether the change to the law - in that case, the general decriminalisation
of anal intercourse amongst men - would have a damaging effect on moral
attitudes. Only if this question could be answered in the affirmative, was the
Government entitled to maintain the legislation."'
Beyond the rich European Convention jurisprudence on the point, the
Human Rights Committee accepted in Toonen v Australia that, under the
ICCPR, morals could constitute a legitimate ground for interfering with a
person's privacy in the sexual sphere, but emphasised that moral issues were
not exclusively a matter of domestic concern, and were subject to the
Committee's supervision.'" Of potential relevance to the Leung case, is that
the Human Rights Committee noted that the provisions in Tasmania were at
the time not being enforced, which, it concluded, implied that they were not
deemed essential to the protection of morals in Tasmania. The Committee
therefore held that the provisions did not meet the reasonableness test, and
arbitrarily interfered with the applicant's private life under the ICCPR."'
0 Dudgeon (n 30 above), para 54.
110 Leung (n 1 above), para 103.
11 Ibid., para 145, citing Sutherland (n 10 above), para 65.
112 As mentioned above, the European Convention, unlike the ICCPR, does not contain an independ-
ent equality provision, rather its equality guarantee in Art 14 can only be raised in conjunction with
another right under the European Convention, hence the Commission's finding of a violation of
privacy in conjunction with the right to equality.
113 Dudgeon (n 30 above), para 80.
114 Toonen v Australia (n 9 above), para 8.6.
115 Ibid.
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Potentially, one could query the necessity of Hong Kong's laws for the protec-
tion of the morals of young people in Hong Kong on the same basis. The
Subcommittee to Study Discrimination on the Ground of Sexual Orienta-
tion was provided with statistics in November 2001, which showed that there
had been no convicted case in Hong Kong of homosexual buggery involving
a man between the ages of 16 and 21.16 The author has requested updated
statistics from the Police Force, but had not received these at the date of
publication of this paper.
Comparative case law also makes it clear that society's values or morals in
and of themselves are not sufficient justification for legislative interference with
the rights to privacy and equality in the realm of sexual relations. In Lawrence
v Texas,"' the United States Supreme Court held that, under the US consti-
tution, laws could not be justified merely on the basis of morality without the
demonstration of actual harm, embracing Justice Steven's declaration in his
Bowers v Hardwick dissent, that "the fact that the governing majority in a
State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient
reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice"." In Nadan and McCoskar,
the Fiji High Court also gave particular attention to this point, recognising
that there was a strong body of conviction in the Fijian community "that any
change in the law to decriminalise homosexual conduct would seriously dam-
age the moral fabric of society", and that this was "certainly relevant for the
purposes of interpretation of the constitution".' The Court continued, how-
ever, that "while members of the public who regard homosexuality as amoral
may be shocked, offended or disturbed by private homosexual acts, this cannot
on its own validate unconstitutional laws" (emphasis added).120 It concluded in
that case that "the right to privacy [is] so important in an open and demo-
cratic society that the morals argument cannot be allowed to trump the
constitutional validity", and that the criminalisation of private consensual
adult sexual acts "against the course of nature" was not a proportionate or
necessary limitation on the right to privacy,121 and also constituted indirect
discrimination on the grounds of gender and sexual orientation.122
Clearly then, Hong Kong's "prevailing social norms and values" 23 are not
enough in themselves to justify section 118C, and, as in the case of protect-
ing health, the Government will surely find it difficult to prove that the threat
of criminal liability, in the form of life imprisonment, over the young people
116 LC Paper No CB(2)2723/01-02 (2002), para 27.
"' 539 US 558 (2003).
118 Ibid., p 17 (citing Bowers v Hardwick 478 US, p 216).
119 Nadan (n 47 above), p 13.
120 Ibid., p 15.
121 Ibid., p 20.
122 Ibid., p 22 .
123 Leung (n I above), para 102.
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themselves is a necessary, rational and proportionate response to the object-
ive of protecting those young people against the moral degradation that is
perceived to ensue from anal intercourse.
Dual Significance of the High Court Finding for Hong Kong's Gay
Community
Danay expresses strong criticism of Justice Hartmann's conclusion that the
right to equality, as well as the right to privacy, is breached by section 1 18C,
asserting that the application of the equality rights analysis in this context
was "ill-advised",' and ought to be reconsidered by the Court of Appeal.
This author does not agree.
Danay's argument is that in respect of provisions which apply neutrally to
people of all sexual orientations, such as section 1 18C, the privacy analysis is
"the preferable constitutional tool".' The use of an indirect equality analysis
in these circumstances, he asserts, promotes and reinforces a "hypersexual-
ised stereotype" of gay people, which is damaging to them and impedes their
equal participation in society."' He argues that because the indirect equality
analysis relies on the court finding, or assuming, as did Justice Hartmann,
that such a law has a disproportionate effect on homosexual men, 117 the courts
are forced to assert, or to imply, that the conduct at issue - here anal sexual
intercourse - is "somehow fundamental to the status of being a homosexual","
"inherent to the identity of homosexual males in a manner that is not so for
heterosexuals and others",'29 and further, that "homosexuals are abnormally
pre-occupied with sex".130
Danay only supports the equality argument being invoked in addition to
the privacy argument where direct discrimination against homosexual people
is evident, as in the case of the other three provisions declared unconstitu-
tional in the Leung case. He states that:
"All three of these provisions are demonstrably directed . . . at homosexual
men in particular. Since the difference in treatment is apparent from the
very nature of the prohibitions themselves, these three provisions can be
effectively impugned through the use of equality rights, without having to
124 Danay (n 6 above), p 567.
12 Ibid., p 547.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid., p 556.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibd., p 561.
130 Ibid., p 558.
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resort to assumptions that promote a damaging hypersexualised homo-
sexual stereotype"."'
In this author's view, however, Justice Hartmann correctly considered all four
impugned provisions together, as "a legislative scheme", rather than in isola-
tion.132 He found the provisions, as a whole, to be "demeaning of gay men",
stereotyping them as "deviant", and aimed at discouraging young men, through
threat of severe sentences of imprisonment, "from what is perceived to be a
chosen lifestyle of which the majority of the community disapprove"."' As
Justice Hartmann notes, when the provisions were enacted, "buggery, even
homosexual buggery, was seen as a morally reprehensible deviance springing
from homosexuality"." This author agrees with Justice Hartmann's view that
the provisions as a whole discriminate against gay men, whether directly (as
in the cases of sections 118H, 118F(2)(a) and 118J(2)(a)) or indirectly (as in
the case of section 11 8C). To now separate out the analysis of section 11 8C,
and to examine it only in privacy terms might offer a convenient compromise
position if the Secretary for Justice does not in fact dispute the privacy ana-
lysis (as discussed above),' 35 but it would devalue the internationally recognised
concept of indirect discrimination3 6 under Hong Kong's otherwise progres-
sive equality jurisprudence.'3 1 It is well established that the concept of indirect
discrimination (as well as the concept of direct discrimination) is funda-
mental to the protection of minorities from majority rule.
Further, notwithstanding that the privacy analysis could (and in this
author's view, should) still result in the striking down of section 118C as con-
stitutionally invalid, such a finding would deny the symbolic, dual significance
for Hong Kong's gay community of the lower court's enlightened judgment,
which both respects the privacy of gay men and affirms their equality in Hong
Kong society.
131 lbid., p 56 1.
132 Leung (n 1 above), para 133.
133 ibid., para 147.
13 Ibid., para 96.
135 See Notice of Appeal (n 27 above), Ground 2.
136 The concept of indirect discrimination has been expressly adopted in Hong Kong's anti-
discrimination ordinances (SDO, s 5; DDO, s 6; Family Status Discrimination Ordinance (Cap 527),
s 5) and, the Government promises, will be also included in the forthcoming racial discrimination
bill, see Carole Petersen, "Racial Equality and the Law: Creating an Effective Statute and Enforce-
ment Model for Hong Kong" (2004) 34 HKLJ 459, 469.
137 See eg, Ng Ka Ling, n 11 above; Secretary for Justice and Others v Chan Wah and Others [2000] HKLRD
641 in which the Court of Final Appeal held the village electoral arrangements discriminated against
men, contrary to the Sex Discrimination Ordinance ("SDO") (Cap 480); Equal Opportunities Com-
mission v Director of Education, [20011 2 HKLRD 690, in which the High Court (in a decision by
Justice Hartmann) held the secondary schools allocation system discriminated against girls, contrary
to the SDO; and KYW v Secretary forJustice DCEO3/1999, in which the District Court held that the
policies of the Fire Services Department and Excise Department not to employ persons who had a
parent who suffered from schizophrenia, were discriminatory under the Disability Discrimination
Ordinance ("DDO") (Cap 487).
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Whilst Danay implicitly recognises that neutral laws governing sexual
activity can indirectly discriminate - referring, for example, to "provisions
that (at least on their face) apply neutrally to heterosexuals and homosexuals
alike""' (emphasis added) - he argues that the courts simply assume there is
such an impact, and through that assumption promote a "hypersexualised
homosexual stereotype". It seems rather far-fetched, however, to argue that
the judgment in Leung (and R v M(C), which Danay tars with the same
brush)' 39 does indeed perpetuate such a "hypersexualised homosexual stereo-
type", either in the sense that anal intercourse is fundamental to the identity
of gay men, or that gay men are abnormally preoccupied with anal inter-
course. It is clear from their judgments that Justice Hartmann and Justice
Abella were concerned with ensuring that gay men have the same choice as
heterosexual men and women to express themselves sexually through pen-
etrative sex at the age of 16 (regardless of their physical make-up, or the
particular orifice involved). It is this deprivation of choice that they held has
an unequal, adverse impact on gay men. Their approach, this author would
argue, positively promotes the perception of homosexual and heterosexual
intercourse as equivalent and equal expressions of sexual intimacy, which
must surely be an emancipatory, rather than a "pernicious" or "damaging"
message, as Danay asserts; that is, a message of true equality, of respect across
difference.
Finally, Danay is correct that, under progressive human rights jurisprud-
ence, the right to privacy is cast as a positive right to autonomy and personal
self-realisation, rather than a negative right to non-interference, as was tradi-
tionally the case. This affirmative interpretation of the right to privacy has
been adopted in a number of cases considering privacy in the sexual sphere.
Justice Sachs delivered a particularly eloquent analysis of the positive aspects
of the right to privacy in the South African Supreme Court case of National
Coalition, which is taken up by the Fiji High Court in Nadan and McCoskar,'"
and indeed by the Hong Kong High Court in Leung.' Thus, in an ideal
world, gay rights advocates should no longer have to fear decisions based on
privacy, as a "poor relation" of equality,'42 confining their protection to the
private sphere of the bedroom, and merely tolerating their shameful exist-
ence behind closed doors (as opposed to positively accepting and valuing
their differences, and embracing them as equals in the community, through
'
38 Danay (n 6 above), p 547.
l3 Ibid., p 557, n 59.
1 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and the South African Human Rights Commission v
Minister for Justice, Minister of Safety and Security and Attorney General of the Witwatersand [1998] (12)
PCLR 1517 (referred to below as "National Coalition"), para 112.
141 Leung (n 1 above), para 116.
142 National Coalition (n 140 above), para 115.
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an equality-based decision)." This view is indeed based on a "rather impov-
erished and out-moded version of the right to privacy as it applies to sexual
relations", as Danay states, echoing Justice Sachs in National Coalition." This
author fears, however, that a privacy analysis might nevertheless send out a
message of begrudging tolerance in Hong Kong, which despite being a mod-
ern, developed, cosmopolitan community, unfortunately lags behind many
other countries in its acceptance of sexual and gender diversity. 1
In any event, a progressive interpretation of the right to privacy should
not preclude consideration of the right to equality. Rather, both rights should
be assessed. Justice Sachs wrote in the National Coalition case that "human
rights are better approached and defended in an integrated rather than a dis-
parate fashion".1'4 If violations of both the right to privacy and the right to
equality are demonstrated, then both of these violations should be declared
by the courts. The Fiji High Court, expressly adopting the views of Justice
Sachs in its review of a facially neutral law, stated that it "did not rank
the rights of privacy and equality in any descending order of value" and said
that the two rights could not be separated, because they were both violated
simultaneously by the challenged law. 47
Finally, Justice Sachs said that "the motif which links and unites equality
and privacy ... is dignity"."' The Fiji High Court echoed this view when it
held in Nadan and McCoskar that "what the constitution requires, is that the
law acknowledges difference, affirms dignity and allows equal respect to every
citizen as they are."149 So too did Justice Hartmann, when he stated that the
Basic Law, in its protection of a wide range of rights, contemplates "an open
and essentially democratic society, one based on equality of all persons before
13 Morgan and Walker argue this point particularly persuasively in their criticism of the Human Rights
Committee's purely privacy-based decision in Toonen v Australia (as noted by Danay (n 6 above),
p 562, n 77), see Wayne Morgan and Kristen Walker, "Tolerance and Homosex: A Policy of
Control and Containment", 20 (1995-1996) Melbourne University Law Review, 202. They conclude
(at 217) that "we want to be valued for who we are, not tolerated despite who we are", and call for a
jurisprudence which is "genuinely inclusive of diversity".
14 Danay (n 6 above), p 563 (echoing Sachs J in National Coalition (n 140 above), p 115).
14 In March 2006, the Hong Kong Government delegation to the United Nations Human Rights
Committee's hearing of Hong Kong's second periodic report under the ICCPR spoke of the
Government's efforts to address discrimination in Hong Kong. Regarding discrimination on the ground
of sexual orientation, the Permanent Secretary for Home Affairs spoke of the community's "deeply
held traditional values and beliefs" and said that the Government's approach "had been one of seek-
ing to balance a vision to take the lead ahead of popular consensus, and caution to build greater
community understanding and support". Despite frequently mentioning the Government's fostering
of "tolerance" in Hong Kong, she also stated more positively that the Government hoped to promote
"cultural acceptance and mutual respect" in this area, see Human Rights Committee takes up Report of
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China: Delegation Outlines Steps Taken to Address Discrim-
ination, Curb Domestic Violence, Foster Tolerance, HR/CT/676 (20 Mar 2006).
146 National Coalition (n 140 above), para 112.
147 Nadan (n 47 above), p 22 (referring to National Coalition, ibid., para 112).
148 National Coalition (n 140 above), para 120.
49 Nadan (n 47 above), p 25.
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the law and on the dignity of the individual", by which he meant "all persons
- in their sameness and difference - being worthy of respect." 5 0
The Court of Appeal is presented with a valuable opportunity to promote
the dignity of Hong Kong's gay community by upholding both aspects of
Justice Hartmann's ruling, namely that section 118C breaches the rights
of gay men to privacy and equality. The Court is urged to reject the Secretary
for Justice's appeal.
150 Leung (n I above), para 108.
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